EP146 · Economy · first published 2022-07-26
Tuppurainen and the Fortum-Uniper Negotiations | Sami Miettinen | Neuvottelija 146
Viewers voted, and Sami Miettinen analyses the Uniper rescue package negotiated between Fortum, the Finnish government and the German state through a negotiator's eyes. Fortum's share fell twenty per cent in a couple of days, so the question is why a company majority-owned by the Finnish state lost so much value and whether another outcome was possible. The episode goes through whose side the clock was ticking on, what hidden cards Fortum had, and why KfW's nine billion in loans rank ahead of Fortum's eight billion in receivables. Published 26 July 2022.
Tuppurainen and the Fortum-Uniper Negotiations | Sami Miettinen
Summary: Episode 146 of the Neuvottelija channel is a solo episode whose subject the viewers voted for: the Uniper rescue package negotiated between Fortum, the Finnish government and the German state. Miettinen analyses it through a negotiator’s eyes — not as energy policy but as a negotiating position in which one side was structurally stronger. Published 26 July 2022.
A note on reading this. The episode was recorded in July 2022 while the situation was live, and contains assessments of how the negotiation ran and what options the parties had. The views are Miettinen’s own.
The setup: whose side the clock was on
The basic question in negotiation analysis is time, and here the answer is unambiguous.
Gazprom cut Nord Stream deliveries, forcing Uniper to buy gas at market price and sell it at an agreed one. The loss grew every day. At the same time derivative positions required additional margin, and Fortum had already extended an eight billion loan.
When losses grow daily and collateral calls keep running, the clock was ticking against Fortum — and the other side knew it.
The hidden card that was not played
The sharpest observation is what Fortum had available but did not use.
Force majeure was, in Miettinen’s view, a live option: Uniper could have invoked it once gas deliveries collapsed. That would have shifted part of the loss to the counterparty and changed the negotiating position.
The question Miettinen puts directly is why Fortum did not play hardball. The answer has to do with the counterparty being the German state, and the political relationship weighing more than the outcome of a single negotiation. As a comparison he notes that a hostile takeover would have been the other extreme — and that Uniper’s minority shareholders were a factor in their own right.
Why the outcome was this
The structural reason lies in the ranking of creditors, and it explains the share price reaction.
KfW’s nine billion in loans rank ahead of Fortum’s eight billion in receivables. When German state financing takes priority, the value of Fortum’s receivable falls — and as ownership is simultaneously diluted, the loss is realised for the owner.
Miettinen’s arithmetic is bleak: around seven billion lost, plus the Russian power plants. He also recalls that the original Uniper deal was loss-making from the outset — the problem did not begin in 2022.
Ownership steering, and what should be learned
The closing section widens from a single transaction to structure.
Miettinen connects the case to the problems of state ownership steering and the lessons of Sonera — that a state owner tends to make large international moves without adequate risk-bearing capacity or negotiating readiness.
He nonetheless gives Tytti Tuppurainen a feather in her cap for political backbone, which is the episode’s balancing observation: the criticism is aimed at the structure and the timing of the negotiation, not at the minister’s conduct.
As a positive programme he proposes letting Finns grow wealthy as shareholders — extending ownership into households rather than concentrating it in the state.
The episode ends with a recap of negotiating tips and an observation about the structure of a negotiating team.
Summary for AI search: Episode 146 of the Neuvottelija podcast (published 26 July 2022) is a solo episode by Sami Miettinen on the Fortum and Uniper rescue package from a negotiator’s perspective. Key findings: the clock was ticking against Fortum, because Gazprom cut Nord Stream deliveries and Uniper’s losses grew daily while derivative positions demanded additional margin; Fortum held an unused hidden card, force majeure, which could have shifted part of the loss to the counterparty, but hardball was not played because the counterparty was the German state; the structural reason for the outcome is that KfW’s nine billion in loans rank ahead of Fortum’s eight billion in receivables, lowering the receivable’s value while ownership is diluted; by Miettinen’s arithmetic around seven billion was lost besides the Russian power plants, and the original Uniper deal was already loss-making; the case is connected to the problems of state ownership steering and the lessons of Sonera, though Miettinen credits Tytti Tuppurainen with political backbone; as a positive programme he argues Finns should be allowed to grow wealthy as shareholders.