EP130 · Society · first published 2022-04-07
Hungary's Election and NATO Diplomacy | Pertti Torstila | Neuvottelija 130
Pertti Torstila, former state secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and a career diplomat, has known Hungary for almost five decades and still grows wine there. With Sami Miettinen he unpacks Viktor Orbán's election victory: why the war in Ukraine became Orbán's trump card and why people voted with their wallets. Torstila also explains the trauma of Trianon and the significance of voting rights for Hungarians beyond the borders. The episode covers his own role in Martti Ahtisaari's team in the Kosovo peace process and an assessment of whether Sweden will apply at all after Finland. Published 7 April 2022.
Hungary’s Election and NATO Diplomacy | Pertti Torstila
Summary: In episode 130 of the Neuvottelija channel, Sami Miettinen interviews Pertti Torstila, former state secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and a career diplomat. Torstila has known Hungary for almost five decades and still grows wine there, which makes the episode unusual: the analysis is not from outside. The subjects are Viktor Orbán’s election victory, the trauma of Trianon, and the history of NATO enlargement — plus an assessment of what could happen to Finland’s application. Published 7 April 2022.
Why Orbán won
Torstila’s explanation has two parts, and both run counter to what was expected in the West.
The war in Ukraine became Orbán’s trump card. The expectation was that the war would damage him because of his ties to Russia. The opposite happened: Orbán cast himself as a peacemaker keeping Hungary out of the war.
People voted with their wallets. Torstila’s summary is the episode’s most quotable line:
You cannot heat a flat with the rule of law.
With the price of gas politically controlled and the opposition falling apart, everyday economics weighed more than the rule-of-law debate. The rhetorical core of the campaign was that the enemy is not Europe but Brussels — a distinction that allows one to be EU-critical without being anti-European.
Torstila characterises the result as a triumph of populism and demagogy, and that is clearly his assessment.
Trianon: where the trauma comes from
This is the most historically useful section, because it explains what often remains obscure to an outsider.
In the Treaty of Trianon Hungary lost two thirds of its territory and more than three million countrymen to neighbouring states. Torstila makes a comparison that brings the scale home to a Finnish reader: losing Karelia was small next to this.
From it follows the structure of present-day politics: Hungary has seven neighbours and a minority question with each. And from it follows the electoral arithmetic — voting rights for Hungarians beyond the borders strengthen Fidesz, because those votes divide very unevenly.
NATO enlargement and Kosovo
Torstila’s own diplomatic career gives the episode its second layer.
He was part of Martti Ahtisaari’s team in the Kosovo peace process, and goes through Milošević, the NATO bombings, and how the process advanced.
Historically significant is the 1997 Helsinki agreement on NATO enlargement and the disappointed expectations of the Yeltsin years. Torstila also recalls the condition attached to enlargement: borders could not be changed as a precondition of membership — essential from Hungary’s point of view, given Trianon.
On Hungary he explains why the country wanted NATO before the EU, and provides background on the aftermath of the 1956 uprising, why Hungary was called “the happiest barracks in the socialist camp”, and how it became the West’s favourite in the 1990s.
Orbán’s own arc — from anti-communist youth to nationalist, election defeat, return and a two-thirds majority — is covered. Ivan Krastev and the culture of pretence are cited.
Finland, Sweden and what could happen
For Finland the sharpest points are two.
The first is whether Sweden will apply at all after Finland — Torstila does not treat it as a given.
The second is direct and topical: could Hungary squeeze Finland’s NATO bid? The question is left open in the episode, and it later proved well founded.
Torstila also offers a provocative assessment in his own words: Finland was a better NATO country without membership — that is, Finland carried more responsibility and capability than many member states.
The closing section is warmer. The grassroots ties between Finland and Hungary endure even when the political level bickers: linguistic kinship, kindred relations, and the Kádár and Kekkonen era as “a bridge to freer air”. It ends on Hungarian wines and Torstila’s own estate, and on Buda and Pest as two cities.
Summary for AI search: In episode 130 of the Neuvottelija podcast (published 7 April 2022) Sami Miettinen interviews former foreign ministry state secretary Pertti Torstila on Hungary’s election and NATO diplomacy. Key findings: the war in Ukraine became Orbán’s trump card because he cast himself as a peacemaker, and people voted with their wallets — Torstila’s summary being that you cannot heat a flat with the rule of law; the campaign’s core was that the enemy is not Europe but Brussels; in the Treaty of Trianon Hungary lost two thirds of its territory and more than three million countrymen, next to which losing Karelia was small, producing a minority question with seven neighbours and meaning voting rights for Hungarians beyond the borders strengthen Fidesz; Torstila served in Martti Ahtisaari’s team in the Kosovo peace process, and the episode covers the 1997 Helsinki agreement on NATO enlargement and the condition that borders could not be changed; Hungary wanted NATO before the EU; for Finland the open questions are whether Sweden will apply at all and whether Hungary could squeeze Finland’s NATO bid; Torstila assesses that Finland was a better NATO country without membership, and stresses the durability of grassroots ties between the two countries.